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ABSTRACT 
One hundred and thirty years after the work of 
Ludwig Boltzmann on the interpretation of the 
irreversibility of physical phenomena, and one 
century after Einstein's formulation of Special 
Relativity, we are still not sure what we mean 
when we talk of “time” or “arrow of time”. We 
shall try to show that one source of this 
difficulty is our tendency to confuse, at least 
verbally, time and becoming, i.e. the course of 
time and the arrow of time, two concepts that 
the formalisms of modern physics are careful to 
distinguish. The course of time is represented 
by a time line that leads us to define time as the 
producer of duration. It is customary to place on 
this time line a small arrow that, ironically, must 
not be confused with the “arrow of time”. This 
small arrow is only there to indicate that the 
course of time is oriented, has a well-defined 
direction, even if this direction is arbitrary. The 
arrow of time, on the other hand, indicates the 
possibility for physical systems to experience, 
over the course of time, changes or transforma-
tions that prevent them from returning to their 
initial state forever. Contrary to what the ex-
pression “arrow of time” suggests, it is there-
fore not a property of time itself but a property 
of certain physical phenomena whose dynamic 
is irreversible. By its very definition, the arrow 
of time presupposes the existence of a well- 
established course of time within which – in 
addition – certain phenomena have their own 
temporal orientation. We think that it is worth-
while to emphasize the difference between sev-
eral issues traditionally subsumed under the 
label “the problem of the direction of time”. If 
the expressions “course of time”, “direction of 
time” and “arrow of time” were better defined, 
systematically distinguished from one another 
and always used in their strictest sense, the 
debate about time, irreversibility and becoming 
in physics would become clearer. 
Keywords: Time, Time’S Arrow; Temporal Asym-
metry; Principle of Causality; Irreversibility 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Each one of us can make the following observation: we 
often talk about time as if it corresponded only to a “be-
coming”, to the stream of changes affecting a thing, a 
person, an institution, a physical system. Certainly, 
change is truly the phenomenon that best suggests the 
idea of time, and one can easily understand why: we 
never encounter a specific and directly perceptible reality 
that would be the time. We only see around us changing 
things, things becoming others, and it is therefore through 
the concrete effect of change that the course of time first 
appears to us. But to conclude from this, as our natural 
language does, that time and becoming are the same is a 
step that is too easily made: without proceeding to further 
investigation, time is mostly referred to as if it resembled 
what it holds. It is said to stop or disappear when nothing 
seems to be happening as if all its dynamics depended not 
upon time itself but upon its contents.  
Such short-cuts serve to answer, before it is even for-
mulated, the question of the relationship between time 
and events, as well as the question of its dynamics: is 
time an abstract structure into which events are inserted, 
that is to say a reality in itself preceding all possible 
events, or is it composed of the stream of events itself? 
In other words, is it legitimate to differentiate time from 
the concrete succession of events? If the answer is yes, 
then what makes time go forward? If the answer is no, 
do events determine its flow? 
Those questions are neither purely academic nor 
purely theoretical. They deserve to be thoroughly exam-
ined since concealing them creates a confusion between 
time and becoming, which leads to a kind of intellectual 
vagueness through repetition: concepts get lost, clouded 
and confused with one another. Moreover, this confusion 
constantly exposes our conception of temporality to 
metaphors that ultimately discourage us from thinking 
about time for what it is. By willing too much to harmo-
nize the representation of time with the experience of 
becoming, common thinking in fact engenders confusion 
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between time and irreversible physical phenomena. At 
least for the sake of hypothesis, and without going back 
to a Newtonian conception of time, why not conceive of 
time as a more fundamental entity than temporal phe-
nomena? A kind of skeletal being whose flesh would be 
made of events? The discreet background of any concrete 
becoming? Those are the questions we would like to dis-
cuss by examining the kind of answers physics provide… 
For this purpose, we have studied the theoretical con-
structions specific to conventional physics (classical 
physics, quantum mechanics, special or general relativ-
ity). As we will see, this study shows that through its 
operational formalisms, physics distinguishes time from 
becoming. It even distinguishes them completely; on one 
side, there is the course of time, a primitive entity, on the 
other side there is the arrow of time, which is not a 
property of time but of the majority of phenomena tak-
ing place in time, specifically irreversible temporal phe-
nomena. 
The course of time establishes an asymmetry between 
past and future: if two events are not simultaneous, then 
one of them is earlier than the other one. It also estab-
lishes a difference of position (but not of nature) be-
tween past and future moments: on a timeline, tomorrow 
isn’t set where yesterday is – a certain amount of time 
separates them definitely. So defined, the course of time 
expresses the irreversibility of time itself. As for the ar-
row of time, it represents the fact that some physical 
systems evolve in an irreversible way throughout time: 
they won’t go back to their previous states. So defined, 
the arrow of time expresses the irreversibility of phe-
nomena within the course of time. It is the concrete 
manifestation of becoming.  
Today, physics has become so spectacularly effective 
that it is possible to imagine that the distinction it makes 
between time and becoming could be transferred to phi-
losophy, which often aggregates the two notions. Espe-
cially because physics not only distinguishes them but 
almost opposes them. In a way, it considers the course of 
time as that which never becomes, in the sense that it 
never changes its way of renewing the present moment 
or, to put it differently, its way of being time. Therefore, 
almost ignoring the meaning of words and going against 
how we normally think of time when we don’t really 
think about it, physics conceives of the existence, within 
the course of time itself, of a principle that remains and 
never changes: within passing time, there is something 
that doesn’t pass, something that time doesn’t affect. 
 
2. TIME AND TEMPORAL PHENOMENA: 
DON’T JUDGE BY APPEARANCES 
Because of a transference process between concepts, we 
don’t distinguish between time and what happens within 
it: we automatically mistake the contents for its container. 
Because we notice that cyclical phenomena exist around 
us, we pretend that the course of time is cyclical. Or, if 
our schedules get crammed, if we manufactured objects 
at a frantic pace, we declare that it is time itself that’s 
speeding up. Our notion of time is always of a time 
marked by events, by the phenomena it contains, a full 
time excluding any notion of emptiness or abstraction. 
It is of course possible to pretend that those are only 
figures of speech, frequently used expressions that don’t 
hinder our understanding of time in any way. But this 
would be to ignore that this shift, this simplification of 
language doesn’t exclusively happen in daily life. Some 
philosophers have repeated it: as soon as they learned 
that scientists have discovered a new category of phe-
nomena, they declare that time itself has therefore been 
modified even that it has just been the object of an onto-
logical revolution.  
On the subject of chaos theory, which shows that a 
system defined by deterministic equations doesn’t nec-
essarily have a predictable evolution, the French phi-
losopher Michel Serres wrote: “Time does not always 
flow according to a line nor according to a plan but, 
rather, according to an extraordinarily complex mixture, 
as though it reflected stopping points, ruptures, deep 
wells, chimneys of thunderous acceleration, rending, 
gaps – all sown at random, at least in a visible disorder. 
Thus, the development of history truly resembles what 
chaos theory describes.”  
What does this mean? That the existence of chaotic 
phenomena necessarily implies that the course of time 
itself is chaotic? But chaos theory, as revolutionary as it 
first appears, can be explained through classical Newto-
nian mechanics. It even belongs to it completely. Neither 
the status nor the representation of time have been modi-
fied by this theory or even questioned by it: time in 
chaos theory is the same as Newtonian time. The dis-
covery of a new typology of phenomena doesn’t neces-
sarily require a new conception of time in order to be 
characterized.  
Similar remarks could be made about a book from 
1979 that has had a lasting influence: The New Alliance 
by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, which is often 
presented as the manifesto for “temps retrouvé” (the 
rediscovery of time) supposedly because its authors con-
clude that: “Today’s physics no longer denies time. It 
acknowledges the irreversible time of evolutions toward 
equilibrium, the rhythmical time of structures whose 
impulse feeds on the world that runs through them, the 
zigzagging time of evolutions through instabilities and 
amplifications of fluctuations, and even the microscopic 
time that reflects the indeterminacy of macroscopic 
physical evolutions.2” But has physics ever “denied” 
time? And what is “rhythmical time”? What about “zig-
1Conversations on Science, Culture and Time, Michel Serres with 
Bruno Latour, University of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 57. 
2Ilya Prigogine, Isabelle Stengers, La Nouvelle Alliance, Paris, Galli-
mard, 1979, p. 275.
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zagging time”? And what kind of time would not be 
“irreversible”?  
To postulate that time is equivalent to what it contains, 
or even that it is generated by phenomena is to concede 
explicitly that a multiplicity of time exists: there would 
then be the same number of times than the number of 
temporalities. In this sense, time is labelled with several 
adjectives that specify the type of phenomena associated 
with it: there is a psychological time, a geological time, a 
astrophysical time, a subjective time, one or several his-
torical times, even a “rhythmical time” or a “zigzagging 
time”, because those phenomena inhabit time in a way 
that varies according to each… Such posture makes be-
lieve that multiple kinds of time can coexist. But could 
there seriously be a time for rocks and one for atoms, a 
time for stars and one for galaxies?  
Ilya Prigogine found it useful to add another element 
to the list: the “entropic time”, which is supposed to re-
flect the irreversible evolution of a system by quantify-
ing the scope of changes that have affected it. This 
“time” is proportional to the variation of a system’s en-
tropy during a given irreversible process.3 What does 
this mean?  
As we know, the entropy of a system is a quantity that 
characterizes the system’s ability to experience sponta-
neous changes: the bigger the entropy, the smaller the 
system’s ability to transform itself. The second law of 
thermodynamics states that a closed system’s entropy 
can only increase throughout time. This means that by 
changing, the system necessarily loses some of its ability 
to change even more. A closed system spontaneously 
tends toward a state of maximum entropy, in which any 
spontaneous transformation will become impossible. 
Let’s take an example: the total entropy of a sugar cube 
and of a cup of coffee being inferior to the entropy of a 
cup of coffee with sugar, a sugar cube dropped into a 
cup of coffee has no choice but to be dissolved into the 
coffee. This phenomenon is irreversible: the sugar cube 
dissolved in the coffee cup will never return to its origi-
nal square shape, nor will it recover its whiteness, and 
the coffee won’t ever get its bitterness back. As such, the 
second law of thermodynamics is in accordance with the 
fact that physical phenomena seem to go in a truly spe-
cific direction.   
Another way of defining entropy is to say that it 
measures the energy quality available within a system. 
The energy is conserved and can therefore only be 
transformed. But during this transformation, its quality 
lessens and it becomes less and less usable. Good quality 
energy is organized energy with little entropy, like the 
entropy of a waterfall whose overall falling movement 
can activate a water turbine. At the bottom of the fall, 
water molecules have lost the vertical organization they 
had during the fall due to the action of gravity. Their 
energy is now of lower quality: it can’t be used so easily.  
That being said, let’s go back to Ilya Prigogine who, 
by using the entropic variation, links the course of 
physical time to processes that happen within it. In fact, 
he creates a kind of time that resembles the phenomena 
it contains and clearly depends on the system. Somehow, 
he “mixes up” the length of time during which the sys-
tem changes and the intensity of these changes: if the 
system doesn’t change, its entropic time doesn’t increase; 
if it changes, its entropic time shifts from physical time 
and this shift depends on the production of entropy. The 
specificity of entropic time is that it stops as soon as the 
system’s entropy becomes constant while physical time 
keeps on passing. Entropic time is similar to Bergsonian 
time: it only passes when it creates novelty. This time is 
only valid for the changes it brings and stops as soon as 
the system can’t evolve anymore4. Besides, the course of 
entropic time has a clearly defined motor: it is “pulled” 
or “pushed” by the irreversibility of temporal processes 
that occur within it. 
But Prigogine is far from having created a new time 
since his definition of entropic time explicitly relies on 
physical time. Entropy variation being the manifestation 
of any irreversible change, it can certainly be used to 
characterize a system’s inner dynamics through its rela-
tionship to the duration of that system’s change. But is it 
therefore judicious to measure a system’s irreversible 
evolution using a variable called “time” if this variable 
has actually been set to proceed outside of…time? “En-
tropic time” appears as a misleading expression in the 
sense that it implies that entropy could be generated by 
time even though it is a quantity linked to what is hap-
pening throughout time.  
This kind of confusion between time and temporal 
phenomena seems implicit, evident, but is it even rele-
vant or justified? Can such assimilation of time with 
temporal developments be found among the formalisms 
of physics?     
 
3. TIME AND BECOMING: PHYSICS 
SEES DOUBLE 
 
Physics formalisms are mostly composed of equations, 
which condense fundamental relationships, reflect es-
sential properties, and reveal things more profound than 
our human discourse can express however subtle it 
might be. But equations don’t speak, at least in the 
common sense of the verb. So what can we say about 
time and becoming that the equations would say if they 
3If dS is the variation of entropy for a system and P(t) the production of 
entropy per unit of physical time, then of course: dS = P(t)dt. The idea 
on which the concept of entropic time is based consists in building a 
“time” t* for the variation of entropy during the time interval dt to be 
proportionnal to dt*: dS = P(t)dt =a.dt*, where a is a constant. We 
therefore have: ∫dt* = (1/a)∫P(t)dt. 
4« Time is invention or it is nothing at all », Henri Bergson, Creative 
Evolution, Courier Dover Publication,1998, p. 341. 
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could speak? 
Here is the short answer to this question: modern 
physics has been constructed through formalisms that 
make a distinction between time and becoming, or more 
precisely between the course of time and the arrow of 
time. Since its birth, that is since the apparition of New-
tonian mechanics, physics has conceived a time that 
doesn’t need something to happen somewhere to pass. 
Physics’ operational effectiveness, its experimental suc-
cesses have become so impressive that it seems right to 
believe that the distinction it establishes between time 
and becoming represents a “negative philosophical dis-
covery” of the highest importance since it alters the 
terms in which the philosophical question of becoming is 
stated.  
We are now going to explain the comment above. 
What does course of time and arrow of time mean?  
The course of time only reflects the passing of time. 
In a way, it is time itself. It is represented by a line, a 
timeline on which a little arrow is usually drawn, an 
arrow that is not the arrow known in physics as the ar-
row of time. It is there to indicate that time has a single 
direction, and that time travel is indeed impossible; our 
presence on the timeline at a specific moment conditions 
our subsequent positions on that line. It is also impossi-
ble to come back, nor to go through the same moment 
twice.  
We have to notice that this depiction of time as a line 
is fundamentally incomplete because it omits indicating 
how this line is built. Since the present does not bring 
another present by itself, there has to be something, an 
“engine” of time, to do this “work”. This little engine is 
responsible of the course of time, in the sense that it 
continuously renews the present: without it, the newness 
of each instant could not arise. Where does this engine 
come from? Is it a property of time itself or a property of 
the arrangement of things in time? Is it linked to a global 
property of the Universe or to our consciousness? The 
answers to these questions have still to be elucidated, so 
that we have to consider that the mystery of time exists 
less in the line through which we represent it than in the 
hidden dynamic that builds this line. 
The course of time has a structure, which by itself 
guarantees that each event is necessarily definitive. As 
soon as the event occurs, this fact can’t be erased by 
anything. If the imprint that the event might have left 
can be erased, this erasure will change the close or dis-
tant future, but not the past. More generally, any present 
action can only have consequences in the future, never in 
the past. The course of time thus maintains a constant 
possibility of distinguishing the past from the future.  
As for the arrow of time, what is it if not the little ar-
row placed on a timeline? Contrary to what the expres-
sion might suggest, it is not related to time itself but to 
what happens within it. It is not an attribute of time, but a 
potential property of physical phenomena; most of what 
exists at our scale is transformed irreversibly throughout 
time and can’t return to its original state. The dynamics 
of those physical phenomena is then marked with an ar-
row, wrongly called the “arrow of time” (since this arrow 
is linked to the dynamics, not to the time itself). 
The problem of the arrow of time is often summarized 
by the following question: why do we remember the past 
and not the future? The answer usually given is that the 
only way of distinguishing between past and future is by 
means of the second law of thermodynamics. But in fact, 
the question asked doesn’t concern the arrow of time 
since the invocation of the course of time is enough to 
answer it: if we do not remember the future, it is because 
we have not yet been present in… the future! Asking 
“Why are we in a different state in the future than in the 
past?” is quite another question (whose answer can be, 
this time, the second law of thermodynamics) that has to 
be distinguished from the first one.  
This example of confusion shows that it is worthwhile 
to emphasize the difference between several issues tradi-
tionally subsumed under the label “the problem of the 
direction of time”. The most invoked concepts are the 
concepts of irreversibility and of time-reversal invari-
ance. Time-reversal invariance is a property of physical 
laws: a law is time-reversal invariant when it is ex-
pressed by a differential equation which is invariant un-
der the transformation t → -t. By contrast, irreversibility 
is a property of processes: a process is irreversible if it is 
always observed in the same temporal order, and never 
in the inverse one. The problem of the arrow of time 
consists in finding out how irreversible processes can be 
explained by means of time-reversal invariant laws (as 
we see, this problem is conceptually different from the 
explanation of the origin of the course of time, and also 
from the description of the engine of time). 
To better grasp this distinction between the course of 
time, the arrow of time and the engine of time, we 
should remember that since Newton, the principle of 
causality has always constrained from the outside the 
representation of the course of time in physics. This 
principle is generally summarized by saying that every 
event has a cause that precedes it, but a point should be 
clarified here. 
Even if it might not seem so, the notion of cause, in 
the strict sense of the term, gave a lot of trouble to 
physicists who ended up abandoning it. After playing an 
essential role in 17th and 18th century physics, its impor-
tance declined with the emergence of probabilities in 
statistical physics. In the 20th century, quantum physics 
definitely wiped it out. Indeed, quantum physics uses 
probabilities in a way that precludes referring to a cause, 
in the strict sense of the term, when talking about quan-
tum processes. Therefore, the notion of cause slowly 
disappeared from scientific theories in favour of the no-
tion of physical laws, or was absorbed by the dynamics 
of systems. 
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The fact remains that the principle of causality, even 
freed of the notion of cause, has enabled the develop-
ment of modern physics’ theories, and deeply structures 
those currently being elaborated, such as superstring 
theory. It sets an absolute and compulsory order between 
several types of phenomena, even if none can be pre-
sented as the cause of another, and thus imposes a direc-
tion to time. In short, the principle is reduced to a classi-
fication method for events that fall under its influence, a 
rule that organizes them according to a systematically 
constraining order.  
In practice, the different formalisms of physics adapt 
the principle of causality to themselves by giving it a 
form that depends on how events and phenomena are 
represented. Its consequences are always constraining. In 
Newtonian physics, causality implies that time is linear 
and non cyclical (which is enough to guarantee that an 
effect can’t influence its cause retroactively). In special 
relativity, it posits that a particle can’t travel faster than 
the speed of light (which is enough to render travelling to 
the past impossible). In non-relativistic quantum physics, 
causality is guaranteed by the structure of Schrödinger’s 
equation5. In particle physics, causality made it possible 
to predict the existence of antimatter, and it is now for-
mally expressed by CPT invariance to which the dynam-
ics of physical phenomena must respond. What does CPT 
invariance represent? The fact that physical laws ruling 
our universe are perfectly identical to the rules of a uni-
verse in which matter and antimatter would interchange 
their roles, observed in a mirror, and where time would 
go backward (CPT invariance imposes that the mass and 
lifetime of particles must be strictly equal to the mass and 
lifetime of their antiparticles).  
Putting aside their most technical aspects, these dec-
linations and implications of the principle of causality 
are quite clear, so clear that they tend to hide a funda-
mental conceptual problem. In fact, the notion of causal-
ity can’t be thought of, or even defined, outside of events 
that embody it. How it relates to the course of time then 
becomes partly ambiguous: if the principle of causality 
constrains the course of time, this means that the latter is 
indirectly “contaminated” by causally related phenom-
ena that occur within it. In other words, the principle of 
causality (partly) aggregates the course of time and 
temporal phenomena despite the distinction established 
between them.        
But we would like to emphasize one thing: in every 
physical theory, once the course of time is dependent 
upon the principle of causality, it then becomes com-
pletely irreversible, in the sense that an instant can’t oc-
cur twice. This irreversibility can never be compensated 
or erased by the reversibility of any movement or dy-
namical process; as fast as one can possibly return from 
Paris after being to Genève, time has irreversibly passed 
during the trip and one is therefore a bit older. More 
generally, the absence of the arrow of time doesn’t stop 
the hours from passing.  
The course of time possesses a direction that is quite 
different from the arrow of time. When it exists, the ar-
row of time appears in addition, “filling up” the irre-
versible course of time with irreversible phenomena. We 
shall later see that physicists have identified possible 
explanations for the irreversibility of phenomena. All of 
them presuppose the existence of a set course of time 
within which time-oriented phenomena take place.  
While time passes, the course of time in itself doesn’t 
change (all successive instants are equal in the sense that 
they have the same status with respect to physical laws). 
It doesn’t change throughout time its way of being time. 
Thus it escapes becoming (the variable t, designing the 
time, doesn’t vary according to time). It is the arrow of 
time that constitutes the true expression of becoming. It 
manifests itself within the course of time, which it 
doesn’t affect in any way but which it overruns with 
mostly irreversible phenomena. In some respects, the 
notion of “the course of time” therefore precedes the 
notion of becoming.  
This is also what the second law of thermodynamics 
suggests: the assertion that the entropy of isolated sys-
tems going through a spontaneous transformation only 
increases with time implicitly presupposes that the 
transformation in question follows the direction of a time 
that leads us from our “past” toward our “future”, and 
not in the opposite direction. It presupposes that the 
course of time has first been defined.      
It is possible to illustrate the distinction between time 
and becoming, to make it visible. Let’s look at the work 
of Roman Opalka who, every day since 1965, has been 
painting a series of integers on canvases then photo-
graphing himself after each work session. The succes-
sion of numbers materializes the irreversible course of 
time, which happens even if nothing happens; if each 
number drawn is new (and each moment is completely 
new), it is always obtained by adding a unit to the pre-
ceding number. As for the photographs the artist takes of 
himself regularly under unchanging conditions (on a 
white background, with a white shirt, under a white light, 
with the same facial expression), they show a series of 
physical changes over time, that is to say the irreversi-
bility of his own becoming. On the one hand, the course 
of time is represented by the succession of numbers and 
the accumulation of canvases; on the other, becoming is 
represented by a series of photographs of the same being 
changing. This dual representation is enough to prove, if 
not to demonstrate, that these two kinds of irreversibility, 
which always appear entangled to the point that they 
seem whole, can in fact be separated. But since they’re 
so often combined and have simultaneous effects, it is 
5In quantum physics, the Hamiltonian is the mathematical operator that 
describes a physical system’s evolution throughout time. Schrödinger’s 
equation makes this operator into the infinitesimal generator of time 
translations. The principle of causality is therefore respected. 
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hard for us not to confuse them even though they are 
always just superposed.     
4. WHERE DOES THE ARROW OF TIME 
COME FROM? 
 
Why are some temporal phenomena irreversible or oth-
ers not? When a phenomena is irreversible, that is to say 
when an arrow of time appears, what is its origin?       
The arrow of time wasn’t part of physics fundamental 
formalisms from the start, neither in classical mechanics, 
nor in quantum physics and the theory of relativity. 
Therefore how do we understand it? Where could it have 
come from?   
The question appeared only a century and half ago, 
when physicists started to ask themselves if physical 
phenomena could “go in both directions”: can a dynamic 
process capable of changing a system from a state A to a 
state B make it change from a state B to a state A? This 
question was born of the conjunction of two apparently 
contradictory observations:    
1) Daily, we can observe around us many physical 
processes for which corresponding reverse processes 
have never been observed or are exceptional. Therefore 
these are, by definition, irreversible phenomena.    
2) Yet none of the dynamics laws that govern these 
processes contain temporal asymmetries, that is to say 
that they would be the same if the course of time was 
going in the opposition direction. If they allow a certain 
process to occur when time goes into one direction, they 
allow it to happen when it goes into the opposite direc-
tion: the initial and final states could be interchanged. 
Such equations are called “T-invariant equations”: if a 
system can go from state A to state B, it should be able 
to go from state B to state A (in that case, the system 
isn’t concerned with the arrow of time).  
Therefore, why are there some irreversible phenom-
ena? Why is there an arrow of time, that is to say an 
asymmetry in the dynamics of certain phenomena that 
we observe, even though the equations of physics have 
no room for it?  
In view of what we have stated above, these questions 
can’t be answered by explaining “the direction of time”, 
by setting out the reasons why it flows in one direction 
rather than another, or even less by explaining why we 
don’t remember the future. The issue is solely related to 
the asymmetry of physical processes within time and not 
to the asymmetry of time itself. It is an asymmetry of the 
“contents” of time, not an asymmetry of the container 
itself. 
To try to solve this riddle, physicists advance four 
categories of argument that can delimit the origins of the 
arrow of time, and they also study their possible in-
ter-relations. We will present them briefly:  
 The second law of thermodynamics, or the increase 
of the entropy of isolated systems. In Boltzmann’s 
interpretation, which underlies this principle, there is 
no arrow of time at the microscopic level, but on a 
macroscopic level, one can get the impression that 
one exists.    
 The process of measurement in quantum physics, 
which has been the subject of intense debate for 
eighty years. Generally, it is understood as a tempo-
rally asymmetrical process.  
 The violation of CP symmetry during certain phe-
nomena governed by the weak interaction: some un-
stable particles, for example neutral kaons, don’t be-
have exactly like their anti-particles. More specifi-
cally, they don’t disintegrate into other particles at 
the same pace than their antiparticles. This means 
that they disintegrate according to a temporally 
asymmetrical law. The fundamental reason for this 
temporal asymmetry, which remains hard to interpret, 
is not completely understood. It raises the question of 
the existence of an “arrow of time” at the micro-
scopic level ; 
 The expansion of the universe, which would make it 
impossible for any system to return to its initial state 
because the universe itself is evolving. This can ap-
pear contradictory since the equations of general 
relativity are temporally symmetrical, but in reality 
their cosmological solutions, which are supposed to 
govern the evolution of the universe, are not. The 
universe they describe is either expanding, or con-
tracting, as represented by the existence of an arrow 
of cosmic time related to the conditions at the limits 
of the universe. Some theorists, including Stephen 
Hawking and Roger Penrose, think that this arrow of 
time could be the arrow mastering all the others, but 
not all physicists share this position.  
We’ve gone far enough to be able to make two re-
marks.  
The first one is that the attempts to explain the arrow 
of time resort to arguments that all differ from the re-
strictions imposed on the course of time by the principle 
of causality. (We mentioned them earlier: linear time, 
the impossibility of going beyond the speed of light, the 
existence of anti-matter, CPT invariance). In conclusion, 
the course of time is accounted for in ways that never 
coincide with ways in which the arrow of time is justified. 
This indicates – or even demonstrates – that the course 
of time and the arrow of time are two distinct things in 
contemporary physics; the irreversibility of phenomena 
doesn’t come from the irreversibility of time and vice 
versa.           
The second remark is that none of the explanations 
given for the arrow of time is likely to constitute a real 
theory. They are closer to an interpretation of such or 
such physical theories, but are not incorporated into any 
formalism. There is indeed no operating physical theory 
that integrates becoming from the start (through the use 
E. Klein / Natural Science 2 (2009) 212-219 
Copyright © 2010 SciRes.                                    Openly accessible at http://www.scirp.org/journal/NS/ 
218 
of irreversible fundamental equations). Consequently, 
becoming can only be accounted for in physics through 
the reading of theories that don’t include it among their 
principles. So interpretations of the arrow of time’s ori-
gins end up mixing physics and philosophy. Thus, they 
can be subject to disagreement and are indeed very ar-
dently disputed. These disagreements are not without 
similarities to the debate between supporters of Par-
menides and supporters of Heraclitus. Some physicists 
think this is only a fake problem: on the pretext that no 
arrow of time appears in physics’ fundamental equations, 
they believe, like Parmenides, that becoming is only 
pure appearance and is closely related to how our limited 
senses make us perceive the world. Others, following the 
Heraclitian tradition, consider that because actual phys-
ics can’t explicitly account for becoming, it is either 
wrong, or incomplete.  
These two positions can be defended as long as there 
is agreement on the meaning of words. And also as long 
as no one is claiming that physics has negated time just 
because its formalisms don’t include the arrow of time. 
For if becoming wasn’t integrated directly into its prin-
ciples, physics has always referred to the course of time. 
One can regret that physics hasn’t integrated becoming 
from the start – or better suggest how physics could 
make room for becoming in its formalisms -, but it can’t 
be blamed for forgetting to integrate the course of time.  
Although, on paper, it is possible to change the sign 
of time in a physical equation, this doesn’t imply that the 
course of time can be physically reversed. Only the di-
rection of phenomena can be physically reversed, not the 
direction of the course of time.  
However let us be clear: it is not excluded that the 
flow of time and the arrow of time come from the same 
source, more profound than they both; that they are 
by-products of underlying phenomena that a “new phys-
ics” might reveal. Moreover, some progress has recently 
been made in that direction, in characterizing causality 
independently of any concept of time and deriving both 
time and becoming from an ordering relation on sets of 
events taken as primitives. It may thus appear that cau-
sality cannot be understood as a feature of the world that 
would exist independently of any phenomenon. Causal-
ity would be intrinsically shaped by the phenomena. As 
the principle of causality underlies our representation of 
time in physics, this would give some formal foundation 
to a close connection between time and becoming. But 
for the time being, it would be wiser to formally distin-
guish them in order to make the arguments clearer. 
This is not always the case. For example, in the cos-
mological context, it is often told that the problem of the 
arrow of time owes its origin to the intuitive asymmetry 
between past and future. According to what we have 
shown, the expression “course of time” would be there 
more appropriate. Because of this confusion, many au-
thors argue that the direction past-to-future is related to 
the direction of the gradient of the entropy function of 
the universe, forgetting that the definition of the entropy 
of the universe is a very controversial matter: entropy is 
a thermodynamic magnitude that is typically associated 
with subsystems of the universe, and not with the uni-
verse as a whole. To evade this difficulty, some authors6 
have tried to define a course of time for the universe 
only on the basis of the geometrical properties of 
space-time, independently of any entropic consideration. 
Unfortunately, they have called this direction past-to-future 
the “global arrow of time”. The expression “global 
course of time” would have suited better. 
 
5. WHAT MAKES THE TIME FLOW? 
 
The nature of the “engine of time” that makes us feel the 
flow of time has not been elucidated but a lot of theo-
retical work is now being devoted to this problem. Dif-
ferent avenues are being explored. In fact, there have 
been three major theories of time’s flow. The first, and 
most popular among physicists, is that the flow is an 
illusion, the product of the faulty river metaphor. The 
second is that it is not an illusion but rather is subjective 
being deeply ingrained due to the nature of our minds. 
The third is that it is objective, a feature of the 
mind-independent reality that is to be found in, say, to-
day scientific laws, or, if it has been missed there, then 
in future scientific laws.  
The first theory, rooted in the theory of relativity, 
represents space-time as a fixed whole and suggests that 
the flow of time is a pure illusion: the entire universe 
just is, with no special meaning attached to the present 
time. All past and future times are equally present, have 
the same degree of existence along time, just as different 
locations coexist along space. According to this view, 
there is nothing special about the “now”. Incidentally, in 
the special theory of relativity, there is an uncountable 
infinity of nows, and the standard symmetries assure that 
none of them can have special significance. 
In the second theory, time would only be a psycho-
logical feature linked to the very complex structure of 
our brain; in the space-time region we are observing, we 
have the feeling that time passes “from the bottom to the 
top” of space-time, but in reality the space-time is a rigid 
block without any internal dynamics. We observers 
would unfold the thread of time ourselves. In other 
words, we would be the “engine” of time. 
The third theory considers that time’s apparent flow is 
real, that it corresponds to a true physical reality. At any 
moment in time an observer perceives a “now”; future 
events are not only unknown but objectively 
6See for example: Mario Castagnino, Olimpia Lombardi, Luis Lara, 
The Global Arrow of Time as a Geometrical Property of the Universe, 
Foundations of Physics, Vol. 33, N° 6, June 2003; G. Matthews, 
“Time’s arrow and the structure of space-time”, Philosophy of Science
46, 82-97 (1979). 
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non-existent, to be created later as the now advances. 
Thus physics should grant time’s flow a well defined 
place in its formalisms7. 
It is not our purpose here to discuss these theories in 
detail or to argue for or against any one of them. We 
merely wished to stress that the common semantic care-
lessness when it comes to the expressions “course of 
time”, “direction of time” and “arrow of time” makes the 
arguments of all parties more confusing than they really 
should be. If these expressions were better defined, sys-
tematically distinguished from one another and always 
used in their strictest sense, the debate about time, irre-
versibility and becoming in physics would become 
clearer. 




What can these considerations teach us? That a more 
carefully chosen vocabulary and a more rigorous con-
ceptualization would give us a chance to show how the 
different theories formalize the course of time, interpret 
the arrow of time, and relate time and becoming. It 
would allow us to better think about the question of 
time. 
Therefore, the principle of causality could benefit 
from being renamed “antecedence principle” or “princi-
ple of chronological protection”, as Stephen Hawking 
proposed it. Similarly, when referring to a physical 
process, the quite awkward expression “time reversal” 
could be replaced by the expression “movement rever-
sal”, since the intention is not to create a time machine 
but to reverse the speed of the physical entities con-
cerned. When a phenomenon’s dynamics are reversible, 
the course of time (or the direction of time) is indeed 
arbitrary, but once it has been chosen, it can’t simply be 
reverted. 
Finally, the situation is the same with the course of 
time as with electrical charges. Saying that the electron 
carries a negative charge and the proton a positive one 
results from a convention. To change this convention 
and declare that an electron’s charge is positive and a 
proton’s negative wouldn’t change anything to the laws 
of physics or the universe. Beginning with a conven-
tional choice, it is therefore possible to design physical 
laws that are unconventional.      
To claim that the course of time doesn’t exist accord-
ing to physics under the pretence the laws of physics are 
time-reversal invariant (so that the direction of time is 
arbitrary) is equivalent to saying that electrical charges 
have no reality because physical laws don’t change if 
each charge’s sign is reversed. 
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